mcp-management

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill's core functionality in scripts/mcp-client.ts involves spawning subprocesses using commands and arguments loaded from the .claude/.mcp.json configuration file, allowing for arbitrary system command execution.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Documentation in README.md and references/configuration.md encourages the use of npx -y to run remote MCP servers, which downloads and executes packages from the npm registry without confirmation or version pinning.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill depends on fetching external code at runtime via package managers, as seen in the installation and configuration guides.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The references/gemini-cli-integration.md guide suggests piping user input directly to the Gemini CLI with the -y flag, which bypasses manual confirmation for tool execution and creates a vulnerability to prompt injection attacks.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting tool metadata from external servers into assets/tools.json.\n
  • Ingestion points: scripts/mcp-client.ts (getAllTools method) collects metadata from all configured MCP servers.\n
  • Boundary markers: None. The metadata is stored in a JSON file and used by the LLM without delimiters or safety warnings.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute system commands and manage network-connected servers.\n
  • Sanitization: None. There is no validation of the metadata returned by remote MCP servers.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:06 PM