skills/bitsoex/bitso-java/stacked-prs/Gen Agent Trust Hub

stacked-prs

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/check-stack-status.ts and the examples in references/automation-patterns.md use execSync to execute shell commands with unsanitized string interpolation for the --repo argument. This allows for potential command injection if a malicious repository name is provided to the script or used in the automation logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation encourages the creation of an autonomous agent that reads and acts upon external pull request comments, which is a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Pull request comment bodies are fetched from the GitHub API in references/automation-patterns.md (e.g., in the getOpenComments and autoFixCallback functions).
  • Boundary markers: None identified. The instructions do not define clear boundaries between system instructions and the content of external comments.
  • Capability inventory: The documented patterns include high-impact capabilities such as command execution (execSync), repository modification (git push), and automated thread interaction via the GitHub CLI.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or validation of the comment content before processing it to determine agent actions or applying code fixes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 09:49 AM