docker-architect
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): High susceptibility to Indirect Prompt Injection during the template rendering process.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/render_template.pyingests data from CLI arguments (--var), JSON files (--vars-file), and environment variables (DOCKER_ARCH_*). - Boundary markers: None. Variables are directly interpolated into Dockerfile and Compose templates using the
{{VAR}}syntax. - Capability inventory: The skill is designed to execute
docker build,docker run, anddocker compose up --buildon the resulting files viascripts/smoke_test_container.shandscripts/smoke_test_compose.sh. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no escaping or validation of variable values. An attacker-controlled variable (e.g.,
DEV_COMMAND) could inject arbitrary shell commands into the final container configuration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill automates the execution of powerful container management commands using configurations generated from untrusted inputs.
- Evidence:
scripts/smoke_test_container.shandscripts/smoke_test_compose.shwrapdockeranddocker composebinaries, allowing the agent to launch containers and mount volumes (e.g.,-v ./:/appindocker-compose.dev.yml) based on files created during the session.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata