bfl-api
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- Data Exposure & Exfiltration (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the agent to read and parse the
.envfile using shell commands (grep and cut) to retrieve theBFL_API_KEY. Accessing environment configuration files is a sensitive operation that exposes potential credentials to the agent's context. This finding is downgraded from HIGH to MEDIUM because it is necessary for the skill's primary purpose of API integration.\n- Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill processes data and URLs from an external API response and uses them in commands that write to the local file system.\n - Ingestion points: The
polling_urland imagesampleURLs are extracted from JSON responses from the BFL API inreferences/code-examples/curl-examples.shandreferences/polling-patterns.md.\n - Boundary markers (absent): No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the API-returned data as untrusted.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
curl -oand Python file-writing operations to save content from remote URLs to the local disk.\n - Sanitization (absent): There is no validation or sanitization of hostnames or URL schemes before processing returned links.
Audit Metadata