domain-init
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/build_registry.jsusesexecSyncto run a sub-process. Therootargument is interpolated directly into the shell command string without proper escaping or sanitization, which could allow arbitrary command execution if a malicious path is provided as an argument. Similar patterns exist inscripts/scan_domains.shwhere the$dirvariable is interpolated intonode -ecalls. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It parses descriptions from untrusted files like
README.mdandpackage.jsonand writes them intoCLAUDE.md. - Ingestion points: Scans
README.md,project.json, andpackage.jsonfiles within the project directory. - Boundary markers: Uses
<!-- domain-registry-start -->markers inCLAUDE.md, but these do not prevent the agent from following instructions contained within the table. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses write access to
CLAUDE.md, a file often containing system-level instructions for AI agents. - Sanitization: Only basic whitespace trimming and markdown bold-character removal are performed on the extracted descriptions.
Audit Metadata