quickstart
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): Documentation in
references/getting-started.mdandreferences/troubleshooting.mdinstructs users to install tools (ao,beads,gastown) from the untrusted GitHub accountboshu2using Homebrew andnpx. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The command
ao init --hooks(mentioned inreferences/troubleshooting.md) installs 'flywheel hooks' that run shell scripts automatically at the start and stop of every agent session. This establishing a persistent code execution vector on the host system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): Troubleshooting instructions suggest reading sensitive files like
~/.claude/settings.json, which may contain user preferences or sensitive configuration data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
scripts/validate.shutility usesbash -cto execute dynamic string arguments, a pattern that can lead to arbitrary code execution if inputs are controlled by an attacker. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points:
/researchand/viberead external codebase files and git history. 2. Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are implemented. 3. Capability inventory: The skill suite executes subprocesses via theaoCLI and modifies local files in the.agents/directory. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization of codebase content is mentioned before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata