trace
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill builds shell commands by directly interpolating user input into strings that are then executed by sub-agents.
- Evidence: In
references/discovery-patterns.md, sub-agent prompts include instructions such asRun this command: cass search "<concept>" --json --limit 10andgrep -l "<concept>" .agents/handoff/*.md. - Risk: A malicious user could provide a concept containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,
"; whoami; #) to execute arbitrary commands with the agent's privileges. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from multiple external sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from
casssession history, git logs, and various files within.agents/handoff/,.agents/research/, and.agents/learnings/. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between its own logic and the content being processed.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (via sub-agents) and write files to the local
.agents/research/directory. - Sanitization: Absent. Data from external sources is not sanitized or validated before being incorporated into the final report summary.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata