NYC
skills/boshu2/agentops/trace/Gen Agent Trust Hub

trace

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill builds shell commands by directly interpolating user input into strings that are then executed by sub-agents.
  • Evidence: In references/discovery-patterns.md, sub-agent prompts include instructions such as Run this command: cass search "<concept>" --json --limit 10 and grep -l "<concept>" .agents/handoff/*.md.
  • Risk: A malicious user could provide a concept containing shell metacharacters (e.g., "; whoami; #) to execute arbitrary commands with the agent's privileges.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from multiple external sources.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data from cass session history, git logs, and various files within .agents/handoff/, .agents/research/, and .agents/learnings/.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between its own logic and the content being processed.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (via sub-agents) and write files to the local .agents/research/ directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent. Data from external sources is not sanitized or validated before being incorporated into the final report summary.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 05:13 PM