agent-consciousness

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read from sensitive local paths including ~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl and .entire/logs/entire.log. These files contain full transcripts of previous AI sessions which often include sensitive information, API keys, or private code snippets that are then processed and stored in the repository's docs/ directory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The architecture requires the setup of pre-push git hooks and the execution of various make commands (e.g., make smoke, make check). This allows the agent to establish persistent, automated execution of scripts within the developer's environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Self-Evolution Cycle' described in the skill creates a significant indirect prompt injection vulnerability. By ingesting past conversation logs and 'crystallizing' them into architecture docs and .control/policy.yaml rules, the system allows instructions from potentially untrusted past inputs to be promoted to enforced system behaviors. Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: ~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl. 2. Boundary markers: None present. 3. Capability inventory: Writing to .control/policy.yaml and managing git hooks. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization logic is described for the bridge script.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill references an external script scripts/conversation-history.py which it instructs the agent to install from a separate knowledge-graph-memory skill. The content of this external script is not provided, making it an unverifiable dependency that executes logic on local session data.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 17, 2026, 07:14 AM