browser

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted web content through an LLM to drive browser actions.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context from any web page loaded via the browser navigate command in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation does not describe the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded in page HTML or text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform complex browser actions (act), extract structured data (extract), and capture screenshots, which could be abused if the agent is misled by page content.
  • Sanitization: No evidence is provided for sanitization or filtering of external web content before it is processed by the underlying AI model.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic execution of browser instructions and requires local system modifications during setup.
  • The browser act command uses Claude to interpret and execute actions within the browser environment at runtime.
  • The setup instructions in SKILL.md require npm link, which modifies the global system path to register the CLI tool.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill manages external code dependencies and browser-initiated file downloads.
  • Downloads the @browserbasehq/stagehand package from the npm registry, which is a verified vendor resource for this skill.
  • Configures the browser via the Chrome DevTools Protocol to allow automatic file downloads to a local directory without enforcing file type restrictions, as described in REFERENCE.md.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 26, 2026, 03:27 PM