company-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant surface for indirect prompt injection as it fetches and processes data from external websites to synthesize research and calculate ICP (Ideal Customer Profile) fit scores. A malicious website could include adversarial instructions designed to manipulate the agent's conclusions or influence the business scoring logic.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/extract_page.mjsutility is used to fetch content (title, meta tags, and body text) from arbitrary URLs discovered via searches. - Boundary markers: While subagent prompts use heredoc delimiters for file writing, they lack explicit instructions or robust delimiters to separate untrusted web content from the agent's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: Subagents are granted access to the Bash tool, which they use to run search queries, extract page content, and write results to the local filesystem.
- Sanitization: The
extract_page.mjsscript performs basic HTML cleaning by removing scripts and styles, but it does not implement semantic sanitization to prevent prompt injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the Bash tool to execute several local utility scripts and the vendor-provided Browserbase (bb) CLI tool for its core operations.
- Evidence: The workflow involves running
node scripts/extract_page.mjs,node scripts/list_urls.mjs, andnode scripts/compile_report.mjs, as well as vendor CLI commands likebb searchandbb fetch. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to retrieve and process data from the open web, which is an inherent part of its functionality but also a security consideration.
- Evidence: The
extract_page.mjsscript utilizes thebb fetchandbb browsecommands to download content from arbitrary external URLs provided by the user or identified through discovery phases.
Audit Metadata