connect

[Skill Scanner] Natural language instruction to download and install from URL detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Natural language instruction to download and install from URL detected (CI009) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Natural language instruction to download and install from URL detected (CI009) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] NOT DIRECTLY MALICIOUS BUT HIGH-PRIVILEGE DESIGN — The code sample implements a brokered integration model that is functional for executing actions across many third-party services. There is no direct evidence in the snippet of obfuscated or explicitly malicious code. However, the design centralizes sensitive credentials and user data with Composio and relies on a single API key plus stored OAuth tokens. This creates a significant attack surface and privacy risk if the broker or the API key are compromised. Before use, validate Composio's security posture (how OAuth tokens are stored and scoped, encryption at rest, token rotation, audit logging, incident response), minimize required scopes, rotate and protect the COMPOSIO_API_KEY (use per-environment least-privilege keys), and ensure users can revoke individual service connections. Treat the package as high-privilege and perform organizational risk assessment and monitoring. LLM verification: The 'connect' skill legitimately implements an agent-action router that forwards user intents to a third-party aggregator (Composio). The code sample itself does not contain clear malicious code, obfuscation, or system takeover routines. The dominant security concern is the architectural choice to centralize credentials and actions in a single third-party service: if Composio or its API key is compromised, the attacker could perform broad actions across many user services. Additional supply-chai