rust-agent-handoff
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The core protocol relies on agents reading 'handoff' files (
.yaml) to understand their tasks and context. These files contain natural language fields such assummary,task, andcontext. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdinstructs agents to usecat <provided-path>and recursive parent lookups during startup. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to treat the YAML content as untrusted or to wrap it in delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The targeted agents (Rust developers, architects, CI/CD) typically possess high-privilege capabilities including file system modification, command execution (
cargo), and network access. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill provides no mechanism to validate or escape the content of the handoff files before they influence the agent's logic.
- Command Execution & Path Traversal (MEDIUM): The 'Reading Parent Context' section in
SKILL.mdprovides bash snippets that are vulnerable to path traversal. - Evidence:
cat ".local/handoff/${PARENT_ID}.yaml"wherePARENT_IDis extracted directly from theparent:field of a YAML file. A malicious actor could set theparentfield to../../../../etc/passwdor similar to trick the agent into reading sensitive system files during its initialization phase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata