systematic-literature-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes paper abstracts retrieved from the arXiv API, which are untrusted external inputs. A maliciously crafted abstract could contain instructions intended to influence the subagent's extraction or the main agent's thematic synthesis. * Ingestion points: Paper abstracts are fetched via the
arxiv_search.pyscript from the externalexport.arxiv.orgAPI. * Boundary markers: The skill instructs agents to use structured prompts with markers like[Paper 1]and explicit field headers when delegating tasks to subagents. * Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the local filesystem (/mnt/user-data/outputs/), execute local scripts, use thetasktool to spawn subagents, and call thepresent_filestool. * Sanitization: Subagent outputs are required to be in structured JSON format and are parsed by the main agent to maintain data integrity. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
arxiv_search.pyscript performs network requests to the official arXiv API to retrieve metadata. This operation is essential for the skill's function and targets a well-known academic service.
Audit Metadata