connecting-to-logseq
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent and user to run several setup and diagnostic scripts stored within the skill directory.
- Evidence: References to
init-environment.py,detect-backend.py,test-connection.py, andpreflight-checks.shinSKILL.mdandreferences/troubleshooting.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external software packages and dependencies from the npm registry.
- Evidence: Instructions for
npm install -g @logseq/cliandnpm installwithin theservers/logseq-mcp/directory. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill involves building a custom MCP server, which requires downloading unknown dependencies at runtime and executing build scripts.
- Evidence:
npm run buildcommand for the Logseq MCP server inSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates reading data from external Logseq graphs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the graph content contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via
logseq.Editor.getPage,logseq.DB.datascriptQuery(HTTP API), andlogseq query(CLI). - Boundary markers: None detected; the skill does not specify delimiters to isolate graph data from the agent's control logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash,Write,Edit, andGlobtools as per the YAML frontmatter inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or instruction filtering for data ingested from Logseq.
Audit Metadata