connecting-to-logseq

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent and user to run several setup and diagnostic scripts stored within the skill directory.
  • Evidence: References to init-environment.py, detect-backend.py, test-connection.py, and preflight-checks.sh in SKILL.md and references/troubleshooting.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external software packages and dependencies from the npm registry.
  • Evidence: Instructions for npm install -g @logseq/cli and npm install within the servers/logseq-mcp/ directory.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill involves building a custom MCP server, which requires downloading unknown dependencies at runtime and executing build scripts.
  • Evidence: npm run build command for the Logseq MCP server in SKILL.md.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates reading data from external Logseq graphs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the graph content contains malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data retrieved via logseq.Editor.getPage, logseq.DB.datascriptQuery (HTTP API), and logseq query (CLI).
  • Boundary markers: None detected; the skill does not specify delimiters to isolate graph data from the agent's control logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted Bash, Write, Edit, and Glob tools as per the YAML frontmatter in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or instruction filtering for data ingested from Logseq.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 9, 2026, 09:58 AM