retrospective-artifacts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fetch_github_context.pyusessubprocess.runto invoke the GitHub CLI (gh api). The command arguments are constructed from identifiers extracted via strict regular expressions, and the use of a command list withsubprocess.run(withoutshell=True) prevents shell injection attacks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from well-known platforms (GitHub, Jira, and Mattermost). These network operations target official APIs, use authenticated requests via environment variables, and are necessary for the skill's documented purpose.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, presenting an indirect prompt injection surface. Ingestion points: External issue bodies, comments, and chat threads are fetched and saved to the
.retrospectives/directory. Boundary markers: No explicit markers or 'ignore' instructions are used to delimit external content within the markdown artifacts. Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for network access (requests), command execution (ghCLI), and local filesystem writes. Sanitization: External content is rendered directly into markdown without sanitization for potential embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata