linkedin-post-generator

[Skill Scanner] Natural language instruction to download and install from URL detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Natural language instruction to download and install from URL detected (CI009) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill appears to be a legitimate orchestration skill for generating LinkedIn posts from user style and source material, and the capabilities align with the described purpose. However it requires sensitive credentials (Fireflies API key, Slack bot token, Google OAuth) and executes several external Python scripts (apify-scrapers, transcript-search, slack-automation, google-workspace) which perform network calls. That delegation creates a notable supply-chain risk: those scripts will run with the user's credentials and could exfiltrate data or misuse tokens if compromised. There is no direct evidence in the provided fragment of deliberate malicious code, obfuscation, or embedded backdoors, but the transitive trust in third-party scripts and scraping tools makes this skill SUSPICIOUS from a supply-chain perspective. Recommend auditing the referenced scripts, limiting token scopes, and treating any download/execute patterns or scrapers as high-risk components.