nano-sign-message
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
bunx,pnpm dlx, andnpxto dynamically download and execute thexno-skillspackage at runtime. By utilizing the@latestversion tag and the-y(yes) flag, the skill executes unpinned code from a public registry without version verification or manual review, exposing the host environment to potential supply chain attacks.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The CLI usage examples demonstrate passing a private key hex string directly as a command-line argument (--key <private-key-hex>). This practice is insecure as it makes sensitive credentials visible in the system's process list and records them in plaintext within the shell's command history.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: To facilitate CLI operations, the skill triggers the download of external software (xno-skillsand@open-wallet-standard/core) from the npm registry whenever the CLI verbs are invoked.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes arbitrary text input for signing, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. A malicious input string could contain instructions intended to manipulate the agent's reasoning. - Ingestion points: The
messageargument in thesign_messagetool and CLI commands. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters to wrap the untrusted message content.
- Capability inventory: Signature generation and CLI interaction via
xno-skills. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not validate or sanitize the message content before processing.
Audit Metadata