image-to-3d
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by accepting unvalidated file paths that are subsequently read or written to by the system.\n
- Ingestion points: The
imagePathandoutputPathparameters in thegenerate_3d_modeltool withinmcp.jsand the CLI wrapper inbin/cli.js.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within processed files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
fs.readFileSyncandfs.writeFileSyncfor file operations, andaxios.postfor network transmission withinindex.js.\n - Sanitization: Absent. The implementation does not perform path validation, extension checking, or directory restriction, allowing access to any file the process has permissions for.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's architecture allows for the reading of local files and their transmission to a configurable network endpoint.\n
- In
index.js, theencodeImagemethod reads the file at the providedimagePathinto a buffer and converts it to base64.\n - The
generateModelmethod then transmits this data via a POST request to the configuredbaseUrl.\n - While the default endpoint is
localhost, the ability to override this via environment variables or CLI flags enables the potential exfiltration of data to external servers if the agent is misdirected.
Audit Metadata