team-issue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. Data sourced from external issue trackers is processed and interpolated into prompts for solution generation and code implementation.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the workflow in
role-specs/explorer.mdviaccw issue status, which is then passed torole-specs/planner.mdand eventuallyrole-specs/implementer.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates in
role-specs/planner.mdandrole-specs/implementer.mduse standard Markdown headers (e.g.,## Issue,## Solution Plan) as delimiters. These markers are insufficient for preventing an adversary from embedding malicious instructions within the data fields. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities across its roles, including the
Bashtool for running CLI commands,WriteandEdittools for file modification, and theAgenttool for spawning sub-agents. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the external data before it is incorporated into executive prompts for the
ccw clitool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the
Bashtool to interact with localccwCLI utilities for issue management and code implementation. While this is core to its intended functionality, the broad execution scope across all worker roles represents a significant capability tier.
Audit Metadata