team-quality-assurance
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code execution through its automated testing pipeline.
- Evidence: The
Executorrole (role-specs/executor.md) runs test suites using system commands such asnpx vitest,npx jest,python -m pytest, andnpx mochabased on the detected framework. - Evidence: The
Generatorrole (role-specs/generator.md) creates and modifies test files at runtime usingWriteandEdittools. - Context: While this is a core requirement for a QA tool, executing code generated by an AI based on existing codebase content inherently carries risk.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The
Scoutrole (role-specs/scout.md) andGeneratorrole (role-specs/generator.md) read source code files, git diffs, and external CLI tool outputs to determine their actions. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the contents of source files during the generation phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including
Bash(*),Write(*),Edit(*), and the ability to spawn further agents viaAgent(*). - Sanitization: Although the
Generatorrole performs syntax checks (e.g.,tsc --noEmit), it does not sanitize the logical content of generated tests for potentially malicious commands that could be triggered during execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references well-known testing frameworks and internal tools.
- Evidence: It utilizes
npxto invokevitest,jest, andmochaas part of the standard testing workflow. - Evidence: It uses
ccw cliwhich appears to be a specialized internal tool for triggering secondary analysis tasks via Gemini.
Audit Metadata