PremiumTranslation

The PremiumTranslation skill is implemented entirely through markdown files (.md). These files serve as detailed instructions and templates for the AI agent, guiding it through a structured, four-phase translation workflow.

1. Prompt Injection: No patterns indicative of prompt injection (e.g., "ignore previous instructions", "override safety", "developer mode") were found. The instructional language is prescriptive but aims to define the AI's role and task execution, not to bypass its safety mechanisms.
2. Data Exfiltration: The skill does not contain any commands or instructions for network communication (curl, wget, fetch, etc.) or for accessing sensitive file paths (e.g., ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa). All file operations are limited to writing output files (.md) within the skill's own output/ directory, which is a controlled and expected behavior for a skill that generates content.
3. Obfuscation: No obfuscated content (Base64, zero-width characters, homoglyphs, URL/hex/HTML encoding) was detected in any of the files. The content is clear and readable.
4. Unverifiable Dependencies: The README.md provides installation instructions using npx skills add and git clone from the skill's own GitHub repository (https://github.com/Cedaric/premium-translation-skill). While Cedaric is not on the list of "Trusted GitHub Organizations," these instructions are for installing the skill itself, not for the skill to download and execute external, unverified code at runtime. Since the skill consists solely of markdown instructions, there are no runtime dependencies that pose a security risk in this category.
5. Privilege Escalation: No commands for privilege escalation (sudo, chmod, service installation, etc.) are present.
6. Persistence Mechanisms: No instructions for establishing persistence (e.g., modifying shell profiles, creating cron jobs, systemd services) were found.
7. Metadata Poisoning: The SKILL.md and README.md contain standard metadata (name, description). No malicious instructions or hidden content were found within these fields.
8. Indirect Prompt Injection: As a skill designed to process and translate user-provided text, it is inherently susceptible to indirect prompt injection if a user provides malicious input within the text to be translated. This is a general risk for any AI skill that processes external content and is noted as an informational warning rather than a direct vulnerability in the skill's code.
9. Time-Delayed / Conditional Attacks: No conditional logic based on time, usage, or environment variables was found that could trigger malicious behavior.

Overall, the skill is a "NO_CODE" skill, meaning it relies purely on natural language instructions to guide the AI. This significantly reduces its attack surface compared to skills that execute scripts or binaries. The analysis confirms that the skill adheres to its stated purpose without introducing any detectable malicious patterns or vulnerabilities.