NYC
skills/cexll/myclaude/omo/Gen Agent Trust Hub

omo

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): Potential for indirect prompt injection. The orchestration logic in SKILL.md passes raw output from search agents (explore, librarian) into the prompt context of agents with write and execution capabilities (develop).
  • Ingestion points: references/librarian.md fetches content from arbitrary external GitHub repositories and web searches. references/explore.md reads content from the local codebase.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses ## Context Pack headers to delimit ingested content in agent prompts, but lacks instructions for agents to ignore malicious commands embedded within that data.
  • Capability inventory: The develop agent (references/develop.md) has the ability to modify files and execute tests, which can be exploited if an injection succeeds.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, escaping, or instruction-filtering for the content passed between agents.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The references/librarian.md agent performs gh repo clone to download external codebases to a temporary directory for analysis. While intended for research, this involves pulling untrusted data into the local environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill relies on a custom wrapper codeagent-wrapper to execute shell-based agent tasks. The README.md also references an unprovided installation script python install.py --module omo, which represents an unverifiable initialization step.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 05:33 PM