omo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): Potential for indirect prompt injection. The orchestration logic in
SKILL.mdpasses raw output from search agents (explore,librarian) into the prompt context of agents with write and execution capabilities (develop). - Ingestion points:
references/librarian.mdfetches content from arbitrary external GitHub repositories and web searches.references/explore.mdreads content from the local codebase. - Boundary markers: The skill uses
## Context Packheaders to delimit ingested content in agent prompts, but lacks instructions for agents to ignore malicious commands embedded within that data. - Capability inventory: The
developagent (references/develop.md) has the ability to modify files and execute tests, which can be exploited if an injection succeeds. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, escaping, or instruction-filtering for the content passed between agents.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The
references/librarian.mdagent performsgh repo cloneto download external codebases to a temporary directory for analysis. While intended for research, this involves pulling untrusted data into the local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill relies on a custom wrapper
codeagent-wrapperto execute shell-based agent tasks. TheREADME.mdalso references an unprovided installation scriptpython install.py --module omo, which represents an unverifiable initialization step.
Audit Metadata