create-agent-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Data Exposure] (HIGH): The skill explicitly interacts with
~/.claude/.env, a sensitive file path used for storing credentials. - Evidence:
references/api-security.mdprovides instructions for the agent to read, source, and append to this file. - Evidence:
references/api-security.mdinstructs usinggrepto check for specific variables inside the.envfile. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): Extensive use of shell commands for filesystem manipulation and script management.
- Evidence:
workflows/add-script.mdandworkflows/add-workflow.mdusemkdir,cat, andlson user-controlled paths. - [Privilege Escalation] (MEDIUM): The skill automatically modifies file permissions for newly created scripts.
- Evidence:
workflows/add-script.md:chmod +x ~/.claude/skills/{skill-name}/scripts/{script-name}.sh. - [Unverifiable Dependencies] (MEDIUM): The skill encourages the installation of arbitrary packages from public registries.
- Evidence:
references/executable-code.mdsuggests runningpip install pypdf. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The audit and verification workflows ingest external skill files which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
cat ~/.claude/skills/{skill-name}/SKILL.mdinworkflows/audit-skill.mdandworkflows/verify-skill.md. - Boundary markers: None present; the agent is instructed to read the full content of potentially untrusted skill files.
- Capability inventory: Filesystem write access, script execution (
chmod +x), and network operations viaWebSearchandContext7MCP. - Sanitization: None; the agent processes the raw content of the ingested files to generate reports or apply fixes.
Audit Metadata