agent-browser

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of an external package 'agent-browser' via npm install -g agent-browser and subsequently downloads Chromium through agent-browser install. These resources do not originate from a recognized trusted organization or well-known service.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The agent-browser eval command allows the agent to execute arbitrary JavaScript strings within the browser session. This capability provides a direct vector for code execution in the browser context, which can be exploited to interact with sensitive session data or bypass client-side security.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to perform complex browser interactions (open, click, fill, screenshot). This gives the agent broad control over a browser process running on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection as it processes untrusted content from the web.
  • Ingestion points: Web content is ingested into the agent context via agent-browser snapshot, agent-browser get text, and agent-browser get html as described in SKILL.md and references/ai-snapshot-workflow.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to treat the retrieved web content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash, can execute arbitrary JS via eval, set credentials, and manage cookies/storage.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the retrieved HTML or text before it is presented to the agent for decision-making.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 11:02 AM