codex-review

[Skill Scanner] Backtick command substitution detected All findings: [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill appears functionally consistent with its stated purpose (Codex CLI-based second-opinion reviews). There are no explicit malicious indicators in the supplied file (no hardcoded secrets, no external untrusted download-and-execute, no obfuscation). However, it executes a local hook script (${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/check-codex.sh) and runs the Codex CLI which transmits prompts/code to OpenAI — both legitimate for the purpose but worthy of caution. Review and audit the hook script and ensure users are aware that code and prompts will be sent to the Codex/OpenAI service before enabling the integration. Overall risk is moderate due to remote transmission of potentially sensitive data and local script execution. LLM verification: The document is a legitimate integration guide for using a Codex CLI as a second-opinion reviewer. It does not contain active malware or obfuscated malicious payloads, but the described operational pattern poses moderate supply-chain and data-exfiltration risks: it recommends sending local files (including config) to an external service and installing third-party tooling without providing redaction, consent, or installer verification guidance. Treat this as a moderate security risk in sensitive