meta-cognition-parallel

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting user queries via $ARGUMENTS and passing them to parallel subagents.
  • Ingestion points: $ARGUMENTS variable in SKILL.md used to construct subagent prompts.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; user input is directly appended to the prompt string with only a markdown header as separation.
  • Capability inventory: Spawns multiple general-purpose sub-tasks in parallel using custom-built prompts.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the user-provided string is performed before interpolation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Subagent instructions are susceptible to override because user input is appended directly to base prompt content retrieved from external files, which lacks structural isolation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a directory traversal pattern to load its execution logic, attempting to read files located outside its skill folder.
  • Evidence: The skill attempts to read ../../agents/layer1-analyzer.md, ../../agents/layer2-analyzer.md, and ../../agents/layer3-analyzer.md to determine its execution mode.
  • This dependency on external file paths could lead to unexpected behavior or unauthorized file access if the environment is not strictly sandboxed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 27, 2026, 11:44 AM