meta-cognition-parallel
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting user queries via
$ARGUMENTSand passing them to parallel subagents. - Ingestion points:
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.mdused to construct subagent prompts. - Boundary markers: Absent; user input is directly appended to the prompt string with only a markdown header as separation.
- Capability inventory: Spawns multiple
general-purposesub-tasks in parallel using custom-built prompts. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the user-provided string is performed before interpolation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Subagent instructions are susceptible to override because user input is appended directly to base prompt content retrieved from external files, which lacks structural isolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a directory traversal pattern to load its execution logic, attempting to read files located outside its skill folder.
- Evidence: The skill attempts to read
../../agents/layer1-analyzer.md,../../agents/layer2-analyzer.md, and../../agents/layer3-analyzer.mdto determine its execution mode. - This dependency on external file paths could lead to unexpected behavior or unauthorized file access if the environment is not strictly sandboxed.
Audit Metadata