skills/chaterm/terminal-skills/ssh/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ssh

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill facilitates arbitrary remote command execution via ssh user@hostname "command". There are no sanitization patterns for the command string, hostnames, or usernames, making it highly susceptible to command injection if integrated into an automated agent pipeline.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): The skill contains multiple instructions to read and manipulate sensitive private keys located in ~/.ssh/. Specifically, commands like cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa or ssh-add expose high-value credentials that could be exfiltrated if the agent is compromised or subjected to a prompt injection attack.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Category 8: Indirect Prompt Injection.
  • Ingestion points: Remote command output, SSH server MOTD/banners, and user-provided host parameters.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters are used to separate untrusted remote output from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Full subprocess execution (ssh, bash), file system modification (authorized_keys), and network tunneling.
  • Sanitization: None. Data from remote hosts is processed as raw text.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (MEDIUM): Recommends the use of Agent Forwarding (ssh -A), which is a known security risk that allows a compromised remote server to access the user's local SSH agent. It also demonstrates manual insertion of keys into authorized_keys without verifying the source.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 02:42 AM