swarm

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via user-provided plan files. Implementation plans are parsed and their content is directly included in the prompts for subagents without sanitization or robust boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Implementation plans (e.g., docs/PLAN.md) are parsed by scripts/swarm.py to extract phase details.
  • Boundary markers: The prompts used to spawn subagents in SKILL.md do not utilize strong delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore potentially malicious content within the plan data.
  • Capability inventory: Spawned subagents possess significant capabilities, including bash execution and file system access within their respective worktrees.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is applied to the content extracted from the plan file before it is interpolated into agent instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's workflow involves the execution of various shell commands and scripts associated with the project being developed.
  • It executes make targets (build, test, worktree) and a project-defined .worktree-setup.sh script to manage environment configuration and dependency installation.
  • The GitHub CLI (gh) is used to create and manage PRs and issues, with arguments derived from the parsed plan file.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The initialization and worktree management process involves the exposure of sensitive environment configuration.
  • Initialization instructions in references/prerequisites.md and references/worktree-guide.md specify symlinking the main .env file into every created git worktree. This practice provides every worker agent and process access to all project-level secrets and credentials.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 2, 2026, 03:50 PM