wechat-illustrator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to useRunCommandto execute a Python script with arguments interpolated from user-controlled content. Specifically, the--promptargument is populated with a summary or extracted 'golden quotes' from the provided article. If the article content is crafted to include shell metacharacters or unescaped quotes, it could lead to arbitrary command execution when the shell processes the command line.- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions inSKILL.mdsuggest passing theDASHSCOPE_API_KEYas a command-line argument (--api-key "USER_API_KEY"). This practice is insecure as it exposes the sensitive key to system process lists (visible viapsortop) and records it in shell history files.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Thesrc/generate_image.pyscript fetches generated illustrations from Alibaba Cloud's DashScope service (dashscope.aliyuncs.com) and downloads them using therequestslibrary.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted article content to generate visual concepts and text. - Ingestion points: User-provided article text or external links processed via instructions in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' directives are provided to separate untrusted article content from the agent's core logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
RunCommandas described in its workflow. - Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement or implementation for input sanitization or shell escaping before the extracted content is interpolated into the executable command.
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