background-tasks
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
dispatchfunction usessubprocess.Popenwithshell=Trueto run strings provided in thecommandargument. This allows for the execution of any shell command supported by the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted JSON input and possesses high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Input data enters the skill via JSON-encoded strings in
sys.argv[1]orsys.stdin, which are parsed into theargsdictionary inmain(). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded instructions are present in the processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary shell commands (
subprocess.Popen), manage processes (os.kill), and perform filesystem operations (read/write). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the
command,cwd, ortask_idinputs before they are used in sensitive operations. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
collectaction returns the contents of task output files. This mechanism can be used to exfiltrate sensitive data if a malicious command (e.g.,cat /etc/passwd) is dispatched first. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
collectaction is vulnerable to path traversal. It uses the user-suppliedtask_idto construct file paths for reading (e.g.,_BG_DIR / f"{task_id}.json") without sanitizing for directory traversal sequences like../, potentially allowing access to files ending in.jsonor.outin other directories.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata