lead-routing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
scoring_promptinSKILL.mduses direct interpolation for the{lead_data}variable. This allows an external actor, such as a lead submitting a form, to potentially influence the AI's scoring and routing behavior through malicious content in CRM fields. - Ingestion points: The
{lead_data}placeholder within theai_scoringsection ofSKILL.mdis the entry point for untrusted lead data. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands are present to separate the system instructions from the processed lead data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant write capabilities via the
hubspot_assign_ownerandsalesforce_routetools, along with Slack notification and workflow management. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of data sanitization or validation routines to filter out malicious instructional language from the lead data before it is interpolated into the prompt.
Audit Metadata