slack-user-cli

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill includes functionality to extract sensitive Slack session tokens (xoxc-) and browser cookies (d) directly from the local environment.\n
  • The login --auto command uses the slacktokens library to access the macOS Keychain and the Slack desktop app's LevelDB database to retrieve active session data.\n
  • The login --browser command reads the user's clipboard using the pbpaste system command to import workspace configurations.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python script executes the pbpaste command via the subprocess module to read data from the system clipboard during the authentication process.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Extracted session credentials, which grant full access to the user's Slack account, are stored in plain text (JSON) in the local configuration directory at ~/.config/slack-user-cli/config.json.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it processes untrusted data from an external source.\n
  • Ingestion points: Commands like read, thread, url, and search fetch and display arbitrary message content from Slack channels and DMs in scripts/slack_user_cli.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within Slack messages.\n
  • Capability inventory: The script possesses write capabilities, including sending messages, uploading files, and editing Slack canvases (using Slack API methods), which could be abused if an injection is successful.\n
  • Sanitization: While the script performs basic HTML-to-text conversion for canvases, it does not sanitize or escape message content to prevent the agent from interpreting embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 01:16 AM