atmos-ansible
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill wraps the
ansible-playbookCLI, allowing the agent to execute automation tasks. It supports a native flag passthrough mechanism using the--delimiter, which allows the execution of any Ansible module, includingansible.builtin.shelloransible.builtin.commandfor arbitrary shell access. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration logic allows the
commandexecutable to be overridden in configuration files (stack manifests oratmos.yaml). This provides a mechanism where a compromised configuration source could redirect the agent to execute a malicious binary instead of the intendedansibletool. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the data it ingests.
- Ingestion points: The skill resolves configuration by reading and deep-merging stack manifests (YAML files).
- Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the manifests are implemented.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands and write files to the local disk based on manifest content.
- Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization or validation of the variables or settings defined in the stack manifests before interpolating them into command-line arguments.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation includes examples that set
ANSIBLE_HOST_KEY_CHECKINGtofalse. While accompanied by a security warning, this configuration disables SSH host key verification, making the connection vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks and potential credential interception. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill handles sensitive references such as
ANSIBLE_VAULT_PASSWORD_FILEand SSH private keys. While no secrets are hardcoded, the skill's primary function involves managing and environment-injecting these credentials.
Audit Metadata