agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes an
evalcommand that allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser's context. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/commands.mddocument theagent-browser evalcommand, including support for stdin and Base64 encoded scripts to bypass shell interpretation issues. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool includes commands to access, save, and manage sensitive session data such as cookies and local storage.
- Evidence:
references/session-management.mdandreferences/authentication.mddescribestate save,cookies, andstorage localcommands used to persist and export authentication tokens. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Local filesystem access is explicitly supported through browser flags and protocols.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddescribes the use of the--allow-file-accessflag andfile://protocol to open and process local documents. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npxto run the browser automation tool and references the installation of external mobile drivers. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdspecifiesallowed-toolsasnpx agent-browser:*and mentions installingappiumfor iOS simulator support. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes content from untrusted external websites.
- Ingestion points:
agent-browser open <url>andagent-browser snapshot(found inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; the agent uses accessibility tree snapshots which include text content from the page.
- Capability inventory: High-risk capabilities include
click,fill,eval, andstate save(found inreferences/commands.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or safety filtering of web content is documented before it is passed to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata