agent-browser

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements commands like agent-browser eval and the wait --fn option, which enable the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code directly within the browser's execution environment.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool includes capabilities to retrieve sensitive user data, specifically through the agent-browser cookies and agent-browser storage local commands, which expose session information and stored application data.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The navigation functionality in agent-browser open explicitly supports the file:// protocol, which can be leveraged to access and read files from the local file system through the browser interface.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core design of interacting with external, untrusted web content.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through every web page navigated to using the open command.
  • Boundary markers: There are no specified mechanisms or instructions to demarcate or ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the HTML or DOM of target websites.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write to the file system (screenshot, pdf, state save), modify network behavior (network route), and execute logic (eval).
  • Sanitization: The documentation does not describe any sanitization, filtering, or validation processes for data extracted from web pages before it is processed by the agent.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Commands such as agent-browser set credentials and proxy configurations with inline authentication encourage the handling of sensitive credentials in plaintext, which may be captured in command histories or logs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 25, 2026, 07:09 AM