tech-lead
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it processes data from external requirements sources.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from Jira ticket summaries and descriptions via the
briannaskill and from user-provided task descriptions inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill instructions do not define explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when passing retrieved data to the implementation or planning phases.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
git,gh,poetry,make), search the filesystem (Grep,Glob), and read files (Read). - Sanitization: Absent; there is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from Jira or user descriptions before using them in command construction or architectural analysis.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute various shell commands to manage the development lifecycle.
- Evidence: Instructions include running
git branch,git checkout,git pull,git push,gh pr create,poetry run pytest, andmake ruffacrossSKILL.mdand referenced guides. - Context: These commands are fundamental to the skill's purpose as a technical lead and are used to manage code changes and verify implementation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves data from an external Jira service.
- Evidence: It uses the
briannaskill to fetch ticket details (summary and description fields) as described in Phase 1 of the implementation workflow. - Context: This is documented neutrally as a requirement-gathering step and is limited to non-sensitive fields.
Audit Metadata