addresszen-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from external Addresszen tool outputs and search results, then feeds that data into execution-capable tools.
- Ingestion points: Data returned by
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSand specific Addresszen tool outputs (e.g., address data, customer records). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: Includes
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLfor performing actions with side effects andRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHwhich likely allows broader execution environments. - Sanitization: None specified. The skill relies on 'schema compliance' but does not validate the content of string fields for malicious instructions.
- [Unverifiable Dependencies] (MEDIUM): The skill requires the user to add an external, non-whitelisted MCP server:
https://rube.app/mcp. This endpoint is not part of the trusted source list (e.g., Anthropic, OpenAI) and represents a third-party dependency with control over the tool schemas and execution logic provided to the agent. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation encourages the use of
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLandRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH. While intended for automation, these tools provide the capability to perform operations on external platforms that could be abused if the agent is compromised via injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata