addresszen-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from external Addresszen tool outputs and search results, then feeds that data into execution-capable tools.
  • Ingestion points: Data returned by RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS and specific Addresszen tool outputs (e.g., address data, customer records).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within retrieved data.
  • Capability inventory: Includes RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL for performing actions with side effects and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH which likely allows broader execution environments.
  • Sanitization: None specified. The skill relies on 'schema compliance' but does not validate the content of string fields for malicious instructions.
  • [Unverifiable Dependencies] (MEDIUM): The skill requires the user to add an external, non-whitelisted MCP server: https://rube.app/mcp. This endpoint is not part of the trusted source list (e.g., Anthropic, OpenAI) and represents a third-party dependency with control over the tool schemas and execution logic provided to the agent.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation encourages the use of RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH. While intended for automation, these tools provide the capability to perform operations on external platforms that could be abused if the agent is compromised via injection.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 07:36 AM