appveyor-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill requires the configuration of an external MCP server endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp). This server is not on the trusted sources list and mediates all tool discovery and execution. The instruction 'No API keys needed — just add the endpoint and it works' suggests a lack of authentication/authorization visibility for the end user.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH):
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from Appveyor (project configurations, build logs, status) and dynamically retrieves tool schemas from the remote rube.app server.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to treat Appveyor output or tool schemas as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, which provide powerful write/execute capabilities within a CI/CD environment.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of content retrieved from Appveyor or the MCP server before it is used to generate tool arguments or influence agent logic.
  • Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The skill relies on RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS to fetch schemas and execution plans at runtime. This 'Always search first' pattern means the actual commands executed are determined by an external server at runtime, bypassing static auditing.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 07:53 AM