baselinker-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): High-risk Indirect Prompt Injection surface. The skill is designed to fetch tool definitions and execution plans from an external source (RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS) and execute them against the Baselinker API.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS responses which provide 'tool slugs, input schemas, and recommended execution plans'.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to treat external schemas as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions in the metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant side-effect capabilities including RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH for executing Baselinker operations.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no requirement for validation or filtering of the schema content before interpolation into tool calls.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on an unverified third-party MCP endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp). This domain is not part of the defined trusted sources and could deliver malicious tool definitions if compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill encourages dynamic discovery and execution of tools (RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL) based on runtime search results, which is a form of dynamic loading of executable paths (tool slugs).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 07:42 AM