blackbaud-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • External Downloads / Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill instructs users to add an external, third-party MCP server URL (https://rube.app/mcp). This server provides the tool logic and executable definitions. Because rube.app is not a recognized trusted source (per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE]), this constitutes an unverified remote dependency that controls agent capabilities.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH):
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS, which provides tool slugs, input schemas, and "recommended execution plans" from the remote server.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or sanitization logic is present to distinguish between legitimate schemas and malicious instructions embedded in the search results.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has high-privilege capabilities including RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL (executing actions on Blackbaud) and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH (bulk operations).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill explicitly instructs the agent to follow the schemas and execution plans returned by the search tool without verification.
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): The RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH tool facilitates the execution of functions like run_composio_tool(), which implies a remote execution environment where the agent's actions are mediated by the unverified rube.app service.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:32 AM