blocknative-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill explicitly instructs the agent to fetch tool schemas and 'recommended execution plans' from a remote source via RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS.
  • Ingestion points: Tool schemas, slugs, and execution plans returned by https://rube.app/mcp.
  • Boundary markers: None. The instructions mandate using 'exact field names and types from search results'.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of blockchain-related tools via Blocknative toolkit, including RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH.
  • Sanitization: None. The agent is directed to follow the remote execution plans directly, creating a massive surface for an attacker-controlled server to dictate agent behavior (e.g., redirecting funds or leaking data).
  • [External Downloads] (HIGH): The skill requires the addition of an external MCP server at https://rube.app/mcp. This domain is not within the defined [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE] and represents an unverified dependency that controls the agent's core capabilities.
  • [Remote Code Execution] (HIGH): The use of RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH and the run_composio_tool() function facilitates the execution of logic on a remote workbench. Since the instructions for what to run are fetched dynamically from the same unverified remote server, this constitutes a high-risk remote execution pattern.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 07:49 AM