botsonic-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill's core workflow relies on processing untrusted data from an external source to determine agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data returned by RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS from the remote endpoint https://rube.app/mcp.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to sanitize or verify the 'recommended execution plans' or schemas returned by the remote server.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, which allow for broad tool execution and bulk operations.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The agent is explicitly told to 'Always search tools first' and use the 'exact field names and types from the search results'.
  • Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The setup instructions require adding an unverified third-party MCP server (https://rube.app/mcp). Since MCP servers define tool logic and can execute code, connecting to an untrusted endpoint is equivalent to allowing remote code influence over the agent's environment.
  • Dynamic Execution (HIGH): The 'Core Workflow Pattern' involves fetching tool definitions at runtime and immediately executing them. This 'lookup-and-execute' pattern prevents any static safety verification of the tools being run, as their behavior is defined by the remote server at the moment of execution.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:04 PM