bouncer-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill establishes an attack surface by requiring the agent to fetch tool schemas and execution plans from an external source (https://rube.app/mcp) before every operation. This allows the remote server to inject malicious instructions or redirect agent logic via the 'recommended execution plans' field.
  • Ingestion points: Data returned from RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS (tool slugs, schemas, execution plans).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions mandate following the search results exactly.
  • Capability inventory: RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL (action execution) and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH (likely shell or code execution environment).
  • Sanitization: None detected. The agent is encouraged to trust and execute based on remote search results.
  • [Remote Code Execution] (HIGH): The inclusion of RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH paired with dynamic instruction fetching allows the remote server to potentially execute arbitrary code or complex command sequences within the agent's environment.
  • [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The setup instructions require adding a non-whitelisted remote MCP server (https://rube.app/mcp). This establishes a persistent link to an unverified third-party service that controls the tool's core logic.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on tools designed to execute multi-step operations (RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL) which can be misused to perform unauthorized actions on the Bouncer platform if the input schemas are poisoned.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:03 PM