breeze-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted data from an external source (Breeze) and possesses high-privilege capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: Data returned from Breeze via RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS (as documented in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to delimit or ignore instructions embedded within retrieved Breeze data.
  • Capability inventory: RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL (write/modify data) and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH (arbitrary tool execution) in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No validation or filtering of content retrieved from the external toolkit is mentioned.
  • [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The setup instructions require the user to add an external third-party MCP server (https://rube.app/mcp). This source is not within the defined [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE] list, meaning the execution logic is entirely controlled by an unverified remote provider.
  • [Remote Code Execution] (MEDIUM): The RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH and RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL patterns allow the agent to execute operations on remote infrastructure. While intended for Breeze automation, the lack of local control over the tool logic presents a risk of arbitrary execution if the remote provider is compromised or malicious.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:44 PM