buildkite-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill relies on RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS to fetch schemas and execution plans at runtime.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters from https://rube.app/mcp and potentially from Buildkite build metadata.
  • Boundary markers: None present in the instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the tool schemas or Buildkite data.
  • Capability inventory: Access to RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH (file/command execution equivalents in a CI context).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization for the dynamic tool arguments fetched from the remote server.
  • Remote Code/Command Execution (HIGH): The tools RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH allow for complex operations within a Buildkite environment. Because the logic and parameters for these tools are determined by a remote server at runtime, it constitutes a remote instruction execution vector.
  • External Dependency (MEDIUM): The skill requires connecting to https://rube.app/mcp. This third-party endpoint is not on the trusted sources list. Any compromise of this service would allow an attacker to inject malicious tool definitions directly into the agent's workflow.
  • Privilege Access (HIGH): The skill specifically automates Buildkite, which is a high-privilege system. Unauthorized access or injection could lead to secret theft (AWS keys, etc. stored in Buildkite) or malicious code injection into the software supply chain.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 09:52 AM