cats-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill relies on fetching tool schemas, pitfalls, and execution plans from an external endpoint via
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSand instructs the agent to execute tools based on this untrusted data.\n - Ingestion points: Data returned by
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSfrom therube.appendpoint (SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is explicitly told to search tools first and follow the returned schemas and execution plans without skepticism.\n
- Capability inventory:
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLandRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHprovide execution capabilities on the 'Cats' platform (SKILL.md).\n - Sanitization: Absent; no validation or escaping is applied to the tool slugs or arguments retrieved from the external source.\n- External Downloads (MEDIUM): The skill requires connecting to an external MCP server at
https://rube.app/mcp, which is not a trusted source and acts as a remote dependency for all operations.\n- Remote Code Execution (MEDIUM):RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHcombined withrun_composio_tool()indicates a pattern of executing complex logic and tools on a remote workbench environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata