chatfai-automation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the user to add a remote MCP server at https://rube.app/mcp. This domain is not among the trusted organizations (like Anthropic, OpenAI, or Google), meaning the tool definitions provided to the agent are unverifiable and controlled by an external party.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH and RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL to perform actions. Since these tools are defined dynamically by the remote server via RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS, the agent is effectively executing remote logic that can change without notice.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect injection because it dynamically ingests instructions from an external source.
  • Ingestion points: Tool schemas and execution plans are fetched from the remote rube.app endpoint via RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS (File: SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used when processing the external schema data.
  • Capability inventory: Access to RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH provides high-privilege execution capabilities (File: SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization is mentioned; the skill explicitly directs the agent to follow 'exact field names and types from the search results'.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:33 PM