esignatures-io-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Unverifiable Dependencies] (HIGH): The skill requires users to add
https://rube.app/mcpas a remote MCP server. This endpoint is not within the trusted provider list. MCP servers can execute arbitrary code on the host or within the agent environment, making this equivalent to a remote code execution vector. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The core workflow relies on
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSto provide 'recommended execution plans' and 'tool slugs'. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(lines 38-40) explicitly tells the agent to use plans and schemas returned from the externalrube.appAPI at runtime. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or sanitization steps are defined to separate tool metadata from executable instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLandRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHcapabilities, allowing it to perform write operations and execute remote logic based on the untrusted search results. - Sanitization: None provided. The agent is instructed to use the exact field names and types returned by the remote source.
- [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (MEDIUM): The skill manages authentication for
esignatures_io. While it uses Composio's infrastructure, the reliance on a third-party MCP wrapper (rube.app) means sensitive signing tokens and document metadata are processed by an unverified intermediary.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata