esignatures-io-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Unverifiable Dependencies] (HIGH): The skill requires users to add https://rube.app/mcp as a remote MCP server. This endpoint is not within the trusted provider list. MCP servers can execute arbitrary code on the host or within the agent environment, making this equivalent to a remote code execution vector.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The core workflow relies on RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS to provide 'recommended execution plans' and 'tool slugs'.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (lines 38-40) explicitly tells the agent to use plans and schemas returned from the external rube.app API at runtime.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or sanitization steps are defined to separate tool metadata from executable instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH capabilities, allowing it to perform write operations and execute remote logic based on the untrusted search results.
  • Sanitization: None provided. The agent is instructed to use the exact field names and types returned by the remote source.
  • [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (MEDIUM): The skill manages authentication for esignatures_io. While it uses Composio's infrastructure, the reliance on a third-party MCP wrapper (rube.app) means sensitive signing tokens and document metadata are processed by an unverified intermediary.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:30 PM