helcim-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [External Downloads] (HIGH): The skill requires the configuration of an untrusted external MCP server at https://rube.app/mcp. This domain is not within the trusted whitelist and serves as an unverified intermediary for all agent-to-Helcim communications.
  • [Data Exfiltration] (HIGH): By design, the skill sends sensitive financial and payment data from Helcim through the rube.app proxy. The 'no API keys needed' setup instruction is a security red flag, as it implies the proxy manages authentication in a non-transparent manner.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill creates a high-severity vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from Helcim and the Rube search tool schemas via RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS and RUBE_GET_TOOL_SCHEMAS.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the core workflow prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege write capabilities via RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL, which can execute financial transactions, and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, which suggests remote environment access.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or output sanitization before data is passed to execution tools.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The use of RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL and RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH facilitates the execution of complex workflows and potential scripts in a remote environment based on dynamically retrieved, untrusted schemas.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:12 PM