highlevel-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill requires the addition of a remote MCP server at
https://rube.app/mcp. This domain is not part of the trusted external sources list, posing a risk of supply-chain or endpoint compromise. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The workflow utilizes
RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLandRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHto execute logic provided by the remote server. The agent is instructed to follow 'recommended execution plans' returned by the remote service, which effectively delegates control of the agent's actions to an external provider. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its reliance on external tool schemas.
- Ingestion points: Data returned from
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS, specifically therecommended execution plansandknown pitfallsfields. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands in the tool output.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform CRM operations via
highleveltools, execute arbitrary code viaRUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH, and manage connections. - Sanitization: None. The instructions mandate using the exact schemas and plans returned by the remote search.
Audit Metadata